We investigate how asymmetric information on …nal demand a¤ects strategic interaction between a downstream monopolist and a set of upstream monopolists, who independently produce complementary inputs. We study an intrinsic private common agency game in which each supplier i independently proposes a pricing schedule contract to the assembler, specifying the supplier's payment as a function of the assembler's purchase of input i. We provide a necessary and su¢ cient equilibrium condition. A lot of equilibria satisfy this condition but there is a unique Pareto-undominated Nash equilibrium from the suppliers' point of view. In this equilibrium there are unavoidable e¢ ciency losses due to excessively low sales of the good. However, suppliers may be able to limit these distortions by implicitly coordinating on an equilibrium with a rigid (positive) output in bad demand circumstances.
Introduction
This paper investigates how asymmetric information on …nal demand a¤ects strategic interaction when a set of upstream monopoly …rms independently 1 provide complementary inputs to the better informed downstream monopolist (complementary monopolies framework 1 ). In particular, we identify unavoidable e¢ ciency losses generated by excessive cumulative input rates 2 and we analyze whether input suppliers are able to mitigate these problems.
These questions are not new but they are now more crucial than they were at the time when Cournot (1838) wrote the Chapter IX of his Recherches sur les Principes Mathématiques de la Théorie des Richesses on the "mutual relations of producers". Whereas Cournot considered copper and zinc suppliers selling to competitive producers of brass, modern examples include a wide range of situations, like for instance: Microsoft and Intel selling respectively chip and operative system to computer makers (HP, Lenovo, Dell..); Boeing buying jet engines to General Electric and avionics to Honeywell. Indeed, as products become more and more sophisticated, input complementarities also become more pervasive. For example, in the biotech industry, modern vaccines incorporate numerous inputs with corresponding third-party proprietary rights attached. In the aviation industry, Laussel (2008) refers that Airbus has no less than 15.000 suppliers among which 600 suppliers are providing parts of planes equipment. Lemley and Shapiro (2006) or Gerardin et al. (2008) refer that modern smartphones incorporate thousands of inputs, whose licenses are held by a fairly large number of …rms. 3 Over two centuries, the economics literature has identi…ed two sources of ine¢ ciency arising within complementary monopolies set-ups: (i) coordination failures among input suppliers and, (ii) double marginalization. First, as follows from the seminal work of Cournot (1838) , the fact that input suppliers set their prices independently (without accounting for the impact of such decisions on other suppliers) leads to ine¢ ciently low output production. Second, as long as upstream …rms exert some degree of bargaining power, they do not account for the e¤ect of their pricing decisions on the downstream …rms'pro…ts, leading to the well-known double marginalization problem (Spengler, 1950) . The two e¤ects result in price (output) levels which are greater (smaller) than the ones which would follow from joint pro…t maximization.
While in a complete information set-up, the adoption of sophisticated pricing strategies (e.g non-linear pricing strategies like two-part tari¤s)is able to eliminate the two distortions described above 4 , we conclude that it is no longer the case when the downstream …rm is better informed about demand than input suppliers. Intuitively, if the suppliers used truthful strategies which are optimal in the full information case, the assembler would misreport (underestimate) the consumers' willingness to pay for the good in order to reduce the payments due to the suppliers. Thus, under asymmetric information, non-linear pricing strategies are no more able to restore joint pro…t maximization of the vertical chain (in an attempt to reduce the assembler's informational rent, each supplier ends up setting an excessively high price for its input). Some …rst insights on the answers to these questions may be drawn from a general paper by Martimort and Stole (2009a) on private common agency games. 5 The authors model competition in non-linear price schedules between two …rms (the principals), each selling one good to a privately informed consumer (the agent) with the two goods ranging from perfect complements to perfect substitutes. Their model may be alternatively interpreted as a game between two upstream …rms and a informed downstream monopolist and, in the perfect complements case, this boils down to our own complementary monopolies model. The authors show that the equilibrium sales level is smaller than the one which would maximize the suppliers'joint pro…ts. However, they only look at the di¤erentiable equilibrium 6 , whereas we …nd that, at least in the perfect complements case, this is only one among a lot of possible equilibria.
More precisely, we consider a game in which each input supplier independently o¤ers to the assembler a non-linear pricing schedule which speci…es the payment required for any given quantity of purchased input. Then, the assembler observes the true demand, deciding whether he accepts or rejects all the suppliers'proposals. Formally, the game we analyze here is an intrinsic private common agency game. 7 In line with the common agency theory, we look for the Nash equilibrium of the intrinsic private common agency game describe above. We …nd a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the assembler's equilibrium sales function (which suppliers, as shown by the seminal works of Whinston (1986a and 1986b) , who conclude that, at the truthful equilibria of common agency games, the aggregate pro…ts of the vertical structure are maximized. All these strategies obey the same simple principle: they make the downstream …rm (the "Agent") the residual claimant with respect to the upstream …rm(s) (the "Principal(s)") 5 Common agency is a formal setting in which several "Principals" choose in a …rst stage transfer schedules intended to in ‡uence second stage actions of an "Agent". Many standard IO models are in fact common agency models with restricted sets of transfer schedules (such as linear or two-part tari¤s). Two papers by Bernheim and Whinston have pioneered the formal study of common agency games: Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) in the case of complete information and Bernheim and Whinston (1986b) in the case of Agent's private information. Applications to IO include Page (1998, 2008) . 6 The only equilibrium they characterize in this context is the di¤erentiable one without any bunching, except at the zero outputs levels (in their framework, this has to do with partial market coverage rather than with true bunching). 7 It is intrinsic because the assembler either contracts with all suppliers or with none of them due to the perfect complementarity of inputs. It is private since each principal (supplier) i 0 s contract is conditional only on the privately observed purchases of input i by the agent (the assembler), thus excluding, under free disposal, the possibility of contracting payments on the level of downstream sales as well as the levels of purchases of the other inputs.
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de…nes equilibrium sales as a function of the realized value of the demand parameter). This condition is twofold. First, it implies a ceiling on the sales level, which is below the level that maximizes the suppliers'aggregate expected pro…ts (leading to unavoidable e¢ ciency losses). Second, it includes a sub-condition, which de…nes a set of admissible sales functions. The latter are such that either (i) the equilibrium sales level increases with the demand unknown parameter or (ii) it is constant over an interval (bunching) of demand realizations. While the second sub-condition is not new for public common agency screening games (see, in particular, Martimort et al. 2016 and Stole, 2015) , it is a new result in for private common agency games. Moreover, in our case, we need to impose an original restriction on the set of equilibrium sales functions (the sales' ceiling referred earlier) so that not all the sales functions satisfying the condition in Martimort et al. (2016) constitute an equilibrium in the present paper.
Nonetheless, this paper shows that a lot of equilibria satisfy our necessary and su¢ cient condition, including regular (di¤erentiable), semi-regular equilibria, constant, step-function equilibria, hybrid equilibria. However, those equilibria are not all equivalent from the suppliers'point of view. We show that there is a unique Pareto-undominated Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium is such that, in the best demand states, sales are strictly increasing with the demand intercept: In the worst demand circumstances, two cases may arise: (i) when the extent of ex-ante demand uncertainty is large, the market is not covered, (ii) when the range of possible demand realizations is su¢ ciently narrow, suppliers prefer to have a rigid (and strictly positive) level of sales, mitigating the underprovision ine¢ ciencies associated with the assembler's informational rent. Although in the last case, there is less ‡exibility to adjust sales to the demand circumstances, suppliers bene…t from selecting the most favorable equilibrium contract (as if they were implicitly coordinating on a strictly positive output level).
The possibility of bunching at the bottom arising in our set-up also looks like an extension to an incomplete information framework of the type of equilibrium with …xed output (in the negotiation phase) proposed by Spulber (2016) to restore allocative e¢ ciency in an upstream-downstream framework with complementary monopolies.
8 Indeed, our equilibrium output level tends in the limit towards a constant one when the ex-ante uncertainty on demand vanishes. However, di¤erently from Spulber (2016), in our case, the e¢ ciency losses are unavoidable since the constant output level remains too low to maximize the joint pro…ts of the vertical structure.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the baseline model. In Section 3, we analyze the assembler's decisions, in Section 4 the suppliers'optimization problems. In Section 5, we characterize the equilibrium sales functions. In Section 6 we review the possible equilibria, identifying which equilibria are Pareto dominated from the supplier's perspective. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude. All the missing proofs are presented in Appendix.
The Model
Consider a downstream monopoly …rm (the "assembler") that manufactures/ assembles a good from n complementary parts. The latter are supplied by n independent upstream …rms (the "subcontractors" or "suppliers"). We assume perfect complementarity among components, meaning that one unit of the good requires one unit of each component part. The set of suppliers is denoted by N . The assembler's and the suppliers constant marginal costs are normalized to zero. 9 For the sake of simplicity, the good's …nal demand is supposed to be linear, with:
where stands for consumers'willingness to pay for the …nal product, P stands for the price in the downstream market and Q 2 [0; q max ] represents the sales in the downstream market (i.e. the assembler's output). The value of is assumed to be private information of the assembler. 10 Each subcontractor has the same prior on ; represented by a cumulative distribution function F (:) and a strictly positive density function f everywhere on [ ; ]. We make the classical assumption that the inverse hazard rate,
This assumption is satis…ed by all the usual distributions (e.g. uniform, exponential, normal, binomial, Poisson..).
We analyze here a two-stage game between the assembler and the suppliers. In the …rst stage, each of the n subcontractors independently o¤ers a upperhemi-continuous tari¤ (pricing schedule) T i : [0; q max ] ! R; i.e. each supplier promises to supply q i 2 [0; q max ] units of input i to the assembler in exchange of a payment 11 T i (q i ): This o¤er is chosen to maximize its own expected pro…t. Then, in the second stage, the assembler learns the realized value of and, given the tari¤s T i (:) proposed by the n suppliers, it accepts or rejects all the subcontractors'proposals. If it rejects them, it does not produce and it earns zero pro…ts. If it accepts them, it chooses, after learning the realized value of ; 9 To avoid any loss of generality, we simply suppose that, when indi¤erent between two supply levels of imput i, a supplier always selects the smallest one. An in…nitesimal cost of production is indeed enough to break a possible indi¤erence.
1 0 Informational issues of this sort are quite common in decentralized supply chains (e.g. Wei, 2006 or Oh and Özer, 2006) . For example, Özer and Wei (2006) argue that "the manufacturer often has better demand information because of her proximity to consumers". It is also worth noting that the model could be easily changed to accomodate asymmetric information about costs instead of demand. 1 1 Throughout the text we will use the terms tari¤ s, payments and pricing schedules interchangeably.
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to produce the output level Q and to buy the quantities of input q i (i = 1; 2; ::; n) which maximize its pro…ts.
The IO problem we are looking at here is formally a common agency game in which the suppliers (the Principals) simultaneously and independently attempt to in ‡uence the assembler's (Agent's) second-period choice of input and output levels. This in ‡uence is exerted through the decision on the pricing schedules which are only restricted here to be upper hemi-continuous. Actually, the standard model in which the suppliers …rst choose the prices of the inputs and the downstream monopolist then …xes its price or output level is nothing else than a common agency model in which the pricing schedules are constrained to be linear.
The common agency game studied in this paper has two key features. It is an intrinsic common agency game because the assembler either contracts with all suppliers or with none of them and it is private since each principal contracts on a di¤erent observed variable chosen by the downstream …rm. It di¤ers from a public common agency game where each principal would o¤er a contract in which the suppliers'payments would all depend on the same variable, such as a "royalty contract" in which all payments depend on the downstream …rm's …nal sales. We implicitly assume here that the sales level is not publicly observable or not contractible or both. Hence, as currently observed in practice, the contract between the downstream …rm and each supplier i speci…es payments which are only conditional on the quantity of input i which is bought by the assembler to supplier i, not on the amount of input actually used 12 . Let q = fq 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q n g be the vector of input levels. Assumption 2 below states that the assembler must buy at least the quantities of input required to produce the intended output level but he is free to buy greater quantities. When doing so, it does not bear any storage or disposal costs. Let now T = fT 1 (:); T 2 (:); :::; T n (:)g be the array of equilibrium tari¤s functions and T i the array of equilibrium tari¤ functions of suppliers other than i. In line with standard common agency theory, we will focus our attention on the pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium, whose formal de…nition is presented below:
De…nition 1 An equilibrium of this game is an array of equilibrium tari¤ functions T , an equilibrium output function Q( ) = Q( ; T ) and an array of equilibrium input functions q( ) = (q 1 ( ) ; :::; q n ( )) = q( ; T ); such that, for any i = 1; 2; :::; n:
where (:) denotes the assembler's pro…t.
Part (i) of De…nition 1 states that, given the realized value of and the pricing schedules previously selected by the n suppliers, the assembler chooses, in the second stage of the game, the sales and input levels which maximize its pro…t.
Part (ii) in De…nition 1 implies that each supplier i chooses, in the …rst stage of the game, the pricing schedule which maximizes its expected pro…t given the pricing schedules of the n 1 other suppliers, subject to the (participation) constraint that the assembler's pro…t should not be negative for any realization of . Then, at this stage of the game, there is a Nash equilibrium in pricing schedules between the n suppliers.
In the standard Principal-Agent model, one usually uses the Mirrlees (1971) trick 13 to have the Principal choose the Agent's action which maximizes its own pro…t for each possible value of and implement it via a contract T instead of selecting directly the optimal contract T . Martimort and Stole (2009a) have shown that, under pricing schedules, the same trick may be used despite the existence of several suppliers: each individual supplier behaves as would a monopolist supplier facing a downstream …rm, i.e. each supplier maximizes with respect to q i an indirect pro…t function (q i ; ); which depends only on q i , and the pricing schedules of the other suppliers: 14 More precisely, the indirect pro…t function (q i ; ) is de…ned as
s:t: Q q j ; 8j = 1; 2; ::; n;
where q i 2 [0; q max ] n 1 is the vector of input quantities of the other suppliers besides supplier i. It is important to notice that the in ‡uence of q i on the agent's (assembler's) indirect pro…t comes here from the constraint on the sales level. Indeed, we de…ne fQ (q i ; ); q i (q i ; ))g = arg max
s:t: Q q j ; j = 1; 2; :; i; ::; n;
so that the functions Q (q i ; ) and q i (q i ; )) show respectively how the sales level and the quantities of inputs bought to other suppliers j 6 = i depend on the quantity of input q i :
We may equivalently write the indirect utility function as
This will be useful when we shall come to supplier i 0 s optimization problem. After making use of Mirrlees (1971) trick, this problem will indeed amount to determine the equilibrium input function q i ( ) which maximizes i 0 s expected pro…t.
Assembler' s Decisions
In the second stage of the game, upon accepting the suppliers' o¤ers, the assembler chooses the quantity Q of output to sell to …nal customers and the quantities of inputs q j (j = 1; 2; ::; n) to buy, which, given the the n suppliers' contracts, maximize its pro…ts for the realized value of the demand shock.
s:t: Q q j ; j = 1; 2; :; i; ::; n: (4b) Remark that the equilibrium sales level can never be greater than the level 2 which would maximize the assembler's pro…t if it could buy the n inputs at zero marginal prices. Otherwise, deviating toward sales equal to 2 would be feasible, allowing the assembler to obtain greater gross pro…ts, while paying (at most) the same global price for the inputs. 15 Let A ( ) denote the maximum of the assembler's pro…t with respect to Q and q 16 ; given the n suppliers' contracts (as speci…ed in equation (5) below). In order to prepare the way for the analysis of the supplier i's optimization problem, let
The Lemma below is standard but important since it shows that the Envelope Theorem applies to the assembler's pro…t function, which constitutes an essential step for using afterwards the Mirrlees trick to solve the suppliers'problems.
Lemma 1 (a) Q is non decreasing and thus almost everywhere di¤ erentiable in ;
(b) A is continuous in and
From Lemma 1 we know that the assembler earns its lowest pro…t in the worst market conditions (i.e. when the realized value of the market size parameter equals ). Moreover, in the second stage, the assembler's minimum possible pro…t from contracting with the subcontractors should not be negative, otherwise it would prefer not to produce. Consequently, condition (iii) in De…nition 1, i.e. the assembler's participation constraint (i.e. the individual rationality condition for the downstream …rm) amounts to
Note also that the absolute continuity of A implies that we can now write A ( ) as
where the term A ( ) represents equilibrium pro…t in the worst market circumstances ( = ): The second term results from the assembler's incentive compatibility constraints, which guarantee the assembler's incentives to reveal the true value of ; and is an informational rent: From (7) follows that, for a realized value of ; the assembler's rent is an increasing function of Q( ): In other words, when the assembler produces more in the bad circumstances there is a larger bene…t to the assembler in good circumstances. This is because the assembler's incentive to misreport a small demand realization is stronger the greater is Q( 0 ): in order to ensure truthful reporting this has to be counterbalanced by a smaller aggregate input price.
In light of the de…nition of A ( ), we …nd that expression (7) is equivalent to the following necessary condition that the sum of suppliers'payments must satisfy for fQ( ); q( )g to maximize the assembler's pro…t:
This condition follows from the Envelope Theorem and it will allow us to eliminate the supplier i's price schedule from i 0 s expected pro…t. Hence, we can now move to the study of the suppliers'optimization problems.
Suppliers'Optimization Problems
In the …rst stage, supplier i 's equilibrium tari¤ should maximize its expected pro…t (corresponding to the expected payments received from the assembler in exchange of the purchase of quantities q i ( ) of input i):
subject to the assembler's incentive compatibility and participation constraints.
Regarding the latter, recall that, in equilibrium, in the worst demand circumstances ( = ); we must have A ( ) = 0; since otherwise any supplier could reach a larger expected pro…t by demanding a larger payment from the assembler, without violating its participation constraint. This follows from the fact that we are considering a model with complementary upstream monopolies and therefore the assembler either accepts all the contracts or rejects them all (choosing not to produce in the last case).
Using now the famous Mirrlees (1971) trick, i.e. substituting for T i (q i ( )) its value from equation (8), the equilibrium input function q i ( ) must maximize the expected pro…t of each supplier
subject to the assembler's incentive compatibility constraint (7) and the participation constraint (6).
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Expression (9) implies that, for each ; supplier i's pro…t equals the aggregate pro…t of the vertical structure minus the assembler's payments to the other suppliers and the assembler's informational rent.
Notice that, contrary to what happens in the one principal -one agent model, the expected pro…t of principal i still depends on the tari¤s of the other principals. It is also important to remark that a supplier i cannot directly in ‡uence the sales level (nor the quantities purchased of the other inputs) since, under the free disposal assumption, the tari¤ T i does not depend on them but only on its supply of input i: This makes a substantial di¤erence with the public common agency game in which contracts ("royalty" ones) depend directly on the level of sales of the downstream …rm. The indirect in ‡uence of q i on Q and q i is described by (3a) in Section 2.
Integrating by parts supplier i's maximand and accounting for (7), we obtain the equivalent condition that q i ( ) should maximize i (q i ; ), corresponding to supplier i 0 s adjusted pro…t. Formally:
where
Indeed, in order to estimate the bene…ts from a given output level Q conditional on ; the supplier must subtract from its direct pro…t the term h( )Q; since h( ) is the marginal increase in the assembler's informational rent, resulting, from a marginal increase of Q at : As already explained, for > 0 ; the assembler's incentives to misreport consumers' willingness to pay for the …nal good (the unknown demand parameter ) are larger the larger is Q ( ) : Accordingly, maintaining a truthful reporting of by the assembler requires supplier i to reduce its …nancial demands.
Given our characterization of i (q i ; ); we can now de…ne S i ( ); corresponding to the maximum of supplier's i indirect adjusted pro…t as follows:
and we shall check later that the unconstrained solution of this problem satis…es the assembler's incentive compatibility constraint derived in Lemma 1, i.e.
@Q( ) @

0:
We are now in position to prove a very useful result: at equilibrium the assembler is induced to buy only the quantities of inputs which are necessary to manufacture the equilibrium output level corresponding to the amount of its …nal sales. The intuition is that supplier i' s preferred sales level is never greater than the sales level which would maximize the assembler's pro…t absent any constraint on the quantity of input i 18 : by selecting a supply of input i equal to its preferred sales level, supplier i induces the assembler to select the latter. Lemma 2 At equilibrium q i ( ) = Q( ); 8i = 1; 2; ::; n:
The above remark points toward an important di¤erence with the public common agency game where the payments are conditional on the sales level. In the latter model, contrary to the present one, equilibrium sales levels above 1 8 Or equivalently if the input i was supplied for free.
may constitute an equilibrium due to decreasing tari¤s: smaller levels of sales may be "punished" by requiring greater payments to suppliers j 6 = i 19 , dissuading a joint deviation towards them by supplier i and the assembler. Under free disposal, it is no more possible to "punish" small out-of-equilibrium sales levels by requiring greater payments since the assembler always buys greater input quantities than required for production if this allows it to pay a smaller price to suppliers 20 , so that a joint deviation by a supplier i and the assembler is pro…table.
(ii) Condition (8) becomes
Lemma 3 below shows that the Envelope Theorem applies both to (i) each supplier's adjusted pro…t function and to (ii) the assembler's pro…t function.
Lemma 3
S i ( ) is absolutely continuous in ; a.e. di¤ erentiable and
Given the absolute continuity of S i ( ); we now obtain
and hence it follows that, if Q( ) is an equilibrium sales function which maximizes supplier i's expected pro…ts, then the tari¤ functions of all principals j 6 = i must satisfy (14):
1 9 We do not mean that such a "punishment" is intentional but that there exist extensions of the other pricipals tari¤ schedules outside the equilibrium range of output which may sustain (i.e. implement) high output levels.
2 0 Notice that the same argument was used to show that the assembler never chooses a sales level greater than 2 : However the restriction imposed by suppliers'behavior is stricter.
Notice that in order to obtain this condition, we have applied nothing else than Mirrlees trick to the principal i's problem (11): we use the Envelope Theorem to obtain a condition which the aggregate transfer function of all other principals j 6 = i must satisfy if Principal i is to (indirectly) select a sales function Q( ): 21 There are n such conditions (one for each supplier i). Now, summing up over these n conditions, we obtain the following necessary condition on the aggregate transfer function of all principals:
In light of this result, we are now able to study the properties of equilibrium sales functions.
Equilibrium Sales Functions
When applying the Envelope Theorem to the assembler and to the suppliers payo¤ functions, we obtained respectively conditions (14) and (15) Taken together, these conditions allow us to eliminate the pricing schedules and to derive a condition which an equilibrium sales function (de…ning equilibrium sales for di¤erent realizations of the demand parameter) must necessarily satisfy. This condition is based on the concept of virtual aggregate pro…t 22 of the vertical structure, which can be formally de…ned as follows:
De…nition 2 The virtual aggregate pro…t of the vertical structure, V (Q; s); is de…ned as:
with the partial derivative V s (Q; s) = (1 nh 0 (s))Q:
Proposition 1 A non-decreasing function Q( ); is an equilibrium sales function if and only if, for 8 2 ; ; (i)
Proposition 1 above fully characterizes the set of equilibrium sales functions and, given Lemma 2, it also characterizes the set of equilibrium input functions of our model. Any such function Q( ), the array of input functions q( ) where q i ( ) = Q( ); i = 1; 2; ::; n; and any n tuple of tari¤s which implements them in the assembler's and the n suppliers' optimization problems 23 constitute an equilibrium of the game following De…nition 1.
Condition (18) is close to the general characterization obtained by Martimort, Semenov and Stole (2016) for public intrinsic common agency games, which amounts mutatis mutandis to state that the equilibrium allocation (here the sales function) is a pointwise maximizer of the virtual surplus 24 . More precisely, a sales function is an equilibrium one only if a …ctitious agent, with payo¤ function V (Q( b ); ) would truthfully report the value of : An equilibrium sales function is necessarily an incentive-compatible one for this …ctitious problem. Formally:
This incidentally answers the question: what does the vertical structure maximize? This is of course a reminiscent of Slade (1994) who found in the oligopoly case "necessary and su¢ cient conditions for Nash equilibria of static and state-space games to be observationally equivalent to single optimization problems".
While in the public intrinsic common agency game studied by Martimort, Semenov and Stole (2016), condition (18) is necessary and su¢ cient, in the case of our (speci…c) private intrinsic common agency game, it is only necessary. 25 Indeed, the private nature of our common agency game together with our free disposal assumption leads to the additional condition (17) , absent in MSS, that, for each ; equilibrium sales are bounded above by the critical value
The necessity of (17) was shown in Remark 1. The necessity of (18) is established from (12) and (15) in an original way, i.e. by generalizing Mirrlees' Trick to a common agency framework. We apply it …rst as usual to the Agent's problem but then as well, by use again the Envelope Theorem, to each of the Principals problems in order to …nally eliminate the transfer functions. To prove the su¢ ciency of (17) and (18), we show that if these two conditions hold, there 2 3 We show in the proof of Proposition 1 that such tari¤s always exist under conditions (17) and (18) . They are not unique since they have to de…ne payments also for quantities outside the equilibrium range. 2 4 Basically that means that an equilibrium sales function must satisfy V (Q( ); )
V (Q( 0 ); ); for all and 0 2 h ; i : 2 5 Moreover, our proof of the common part of the equilibrium conditions is di¤erent and may have an interest in itself, outside the context in which it is obtained. What we do is basically to generalize Mirrlees' Trick to a common agency framework by applying it …rst as usual to the Agent's problem but then as well, by using again the Envelope Theorem, to each of the Principals problems in order to …nally eliminate the transfer functions and then obtain an equilibrium condition. This methodology was already applied in Laussel and Palfrey (2002) to characterize the equilibria of a Bayesian common agency game. exist price schedules which implement the equilibrium sales and input functions both in the assembler's and in each supplier's problems.
Corollary 2 below shows that Q( ) is non-decreasing as assumed before: over any given interval where it is di¤erentiable, either it is constant (bunching) or equal to a ‡exible sales level
Note that Q D ( ) is weakly increasing in , since h 0 ( ) 0; by Assumption 1. The "maximal output level"
26 which maximizes for a given the virtual aggregate pro…t of the vertical structure subject to the only constraint Q 2
Corollary 2 For 2 [ ; ] an equilibrium output function Q( ) is, at any point of di¤ erentiability (almost everywhere), either such that Q 0 ( ) = 0 or such that the output level is equal to Q D ( ) ; de…ned above. Given Assumption 1; Q( ) is non-decreasing in :
We are now able to prove an intermediate result 27 which will be very useful in the subsequent analysis.
Lemma 4
The virtual aggregate pro…t function V (Q( ); ) is continuous w.r.t.
over ; :
The previous results show that, at equilibrium, the virtual aggregate pro…t is a continuous non-decreasing function of the private information parameter (monotonicity follows from the Envelope Theorem) More importantly, for any value of this parameter, equilibrium output either is increasing and it maximizes the virtual aggregate pro…t or it is constant over an interval (bunching). Moreover, there must be bunching both at the right and at the left of any point of discontinuity of the equilibrium sales function.
A lot of equilibria do satisfy the conditions in Proposition 1. In the following Section, we present a systematic characterization of the possible equilibrium con…gurations. We start with continuous equilibria, in which the equilibrium sales are a continuous function of : Later on, we address discontinuous equilibria.
Even before looking at the equilibria con…gurations, it is worth noting that a close examination of the virtual surplus function (16) _ of which the equilibrium output function is a pointwise maximizer according to (19) _ and of the "maximal output function" _ which maximizes the virtual surplus function over the whole range [0; q max ] _ already suggests that ine¢ ciencies are going to exist at equilibrium and to be the more severe the greater is the number of suppliers.
Each supplier, when designing its pricing schedule knows from the assembler's incentive compatibility constraints that larger output levels for "bad" realized values of the demand parameter result in larger pro…ts left to the assembler for better demand realizations. Accounting for this e¤ect, the equilibrium pricing schedules are not truthful, inducing the choice of output levels below the optimal ones (except for the "best" realized value of the demand parameter). Moreover this ine¢ ciency is all the more severe as the number of suppliers is itself greater. Each supplier when trying to reduce the informational rents left to the assembler designs pricing schedules which overvalue the marginal cost which they incur from input production and, at the same time, signals to the other suppliers that it would ask more money for any output increase, reducing even more the other suppliers'desired sales level. Thus, uncoordinated attempts to reduce the assembler's rents result in cumulative ine¢ ciencies.
6 Equilibria characterization
Continuous Equilibria
The simplest continuous equilibrium is the constant equilibrium sales one. This is an equilibrium such that the equilibrium sales are constant over ; ; i.e. These equilibria are like bootstrap ones: each supplier selects the constant output level because the other ones do it as well. They are implementable via simple pricing schedules such that T (Q) = Q 0 ( Q 0 ); 8Q Q 0 and T (Q) very large for all Q > Q 0 : When the n suppliers select this type of pricing schedule, the assembler has no better choice that Q( ) = Q 0 for all . Similarly, a supplier i cannot do better than choosing Q( ) = Q 0 when the n 1 other ones select this type of pricing schedule.
From (7), it is easy to compute the assembler's pro…t conditional on
and its expected pro…t is E [
The expected true aggregate pro…t of the vertical structure equals
Hence, the ex-ante expected aggregate pro…t of suppliers,
; the ex-ante aggregate pro…t of suppliers are positive.
with respect to Q 0 ; it is easy to see that the best constant equilibrium sales level from the suppliers' point of view is such that
: A greater sales level (for instance equal to 2 ), which would potentially yield greater aggregate pro…ts to suppliers, cannot be implemented under free disposal. An individual supplier would indeed bene…t from deviating to a smaller sales level (for instance
) unless the other suppliers impose a punishment on the assembler for buying quantities of input smaller than 2 : Such a punishment is impossible under free disposal since the assembler would optimally choose to purchase input quantities 2 while using smaller ones
The next continuous equilibrium we analyze is the continuously di¤er-entiable (or regular) equilibrium. In this case, the corresponding sales function is given by Q D ( ) and equilibrium sales are strictly increasing in ; meaning that output is larger in better states of demand, as represented in the following Figure: ; 8 2 ; : An obvious necessary condition for the existence of a regular equilibrium is that the equilibrium ‡exible output Q D ( ) must be non-negative for all 2 ; , i.e. that the market is covered: Given that, by Assumption 1, nh( ) is non-decreasing in ; this amounts to the condition nh( ) 0: As the number of independent suppliers increases, this condition becomes more di¢ cult to satisfy. For instance, in the case of an uniform distribution, it requires that n n+1 : So it's natural to consider as well semi-regular equilibria. Semi-regular equilibria are continuous equilibria in which the equilibrium sales are: (i) constant over some interval and 
and Q( ) = Q 2 ; 8 2 x 2 ; : Among semi-regular equilibrium, the maximal equilibrium has attracted much attention. We now present below a natural example of the maximal equilibrium when there is a uniform distribution of between 0 and 1: Example 1 When is uniformly distributed over [0; 1] ; any maximal equilibrium is the following type I-semi-regular equilibrium which satis…es:
; 8Q 2 0; The second result in Example 1 shows that the equilibrium level of …nal sales is a decreasing function of n for 2 [0; 1] : The coordination failure is, as usual, all the more severe as the number of suppliers increases. The third result is specially interesting. First it shows that the marginal input price is larger than the marginal cost. Second, it shows that, for any positive sales level, the input price paid by the assembler to each supplier is decreasing with the number of subcontractors. This is of course a reminiscent of the similar result obtained in a model where subcontractors compete in linear prices, following from the strategic complementary in the suppliers'prices (see Laussel, 2008) .
Remark 2
In the context of Example 1, we obtain that the ex-ante expected pro…t of the assembler, E A ; is equal to
whereas, the expected pro…t of subcontractor i; denoted E S i ; is
Interestingly, the values given by equations (20) and (21) are exactly identical to those obtained in a model with no uncertainty ( = 1 with probability 1), independent upstream …rms only and linear prices (see Laussel, 2008 ).
Discontinuous Equilibria
A n step-function equilibrium is an equilibrium in which ; is divided in
; 8j. In an n-stepfunction equilibrium, with n > 0, the equilibrium sales function is discontinuous. More precisely, in an n-step equilibrium, the equilibrium sales function shows a number n of upward jumps as the parameter increases from to and the level of sales is constant over each interval. The following Figure illustrates the equilibrium output function in the case of a 1 step-function equilibrium.
Fig.5 -1-step function equilibrium
Corollary 3 From Lemma 4, an n step equilibrium is such that at each point x i ; i 1; i n; the condition V (Q i 1 ; x i ) = V (Q i ; x i ) must hold or, equivalently, x i nh(x i ) = Q i 1 + Q i : Since the function nh( ) is increasing in and it takes its maximum at = ; it follows that all successive output pairs must satisfy the su¢ cient condition Q i 1 + Q i : I
A hybrid equilibrium is a discontinuous equilibrium such that ; is divided in n + 1 (a …nite number) intervals [x j ; x j+1 ), so that (i) there is at least one interval over which Q( ) takes a constant value, (ii) there is at least one interval over which Q( ) = Q D ( ) (iii) there is at least one x j such that lim 
Equilibria Selection
The previous analysis shows that there are a large number of equilibria as long as there are more than one supplier. When n > 1; as we argued in the constant equilibrium sales case, the suppliers may implicitly coordinate on a lot of di¤erent equilibria by choosing the corresponding pricing schedules. Hence, we investigate here the equilibria which are Pareto-dominated from the suppliers' point of view. The …rst steps will be to show that semi-regular equilibria of type (II) and type (III) and discontinuous equilibria are indeed Pareto-dominated (see Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 below, respectively) allowing us to restrict our attention to regular equilibria and semi-regular equilibria of type (I). At this point, it is worthwhile to derive simple expressions for the expected aggregate suppliers'pro…ts E[ S ].
Remark 3
The equilibrium expected aggregate suppliers' pro…ts is
or, equivalently,
From (22), the expected aggregate suppliers'pro…t equals the expected virtual surplus in the case n = 1, i.e. when there is only one supplier. The intuition is that, would all suppliers act cooperatively, they would maximize joint expected pro…ts, which are equal to the expected virtual surplus for n = 1; as a result of equation (9).
Lemma 5 below shows that from the suppliers'point of view, a constant level of sales Q D (x) over (x; ] is ine¢ ciently low. The optimal output level from the suppliers'point of view is indeed given by the value of Q D ( ) when n = 1, i.e. It is also possible to show that hybrid equilibria are Pareto dominated because, over the discontinuity range [x 0 ; x 1 ], it is always better to switch to a ‡exible sales level Q D ( ) rather than to stick to the two constant output levels Q D (x 0 ) and Q D (x 1 ). To this end, for any arbitrary sales function ( ) ; let us consider an equilibrium sales function Q H ( ) such that
with < x 0 < x < x 1 < : Lemma 6 shows that such step-wise function is Pareto dominated by a sales function Q C ( ) which is identical to Q H ( ) except for the fact that it is continuous between between x 0 and x 1
The following …gure illustrates the behavior of Q H ( ) in the solid line and Q C ( ) ; in the dashed line (note that the two coincide when < x 0 or x 1 < ).
In order to prove that all hybrid equilibria are Pareto-dominated by equilibria regularized in the way described by (25) , we now introduce a new condition on the distribution of types 29 . Assumption 3: For almost all 2 ; ;
Assumption 3, which means that the hazard rate should not be too convex, is identical, mutatis mutandis, 30 to Assumption 2 (page 19) in MSS (2016). 31 To derive it, they use Amador and Bagwell (2013) results on optimal delegation. In their framework, it is a su¢ cient condition for the existence of a ‡oor equilibrium in a public common agency game. We use it in Lemma 6 below to rule out any discontinuous equilibrium. 32 The proof is much simpler than the one from Amador and Bagwell (2013). The purpose of Assumption 3 is also more intuitive in the present framework.
Lemma 6 Under Assumptions 1 and 3, an equilibrium such that the sales function is given by Q H ( ) de…ned in (24) is Pareto dominated by an equilibrium such that the sales function is given by Q C ( ) in (25) . 
or (ii) semi-regular equilibria in which the equilibrium sales function is increasing for the highest values of (being constant for low values);
We now need to study how these equilibria are Pareto-ranked from the point of view of the suppliers. To do so, notice that, from a formal point of view, a regular equilibrium is simply a semi-regular equilibrium, with SR = . Hence, ranking the equilibria in (27) and (28) Proposition 2 (i) Su¢ ciency: If Assumptions 1 and 3 hold, the best, Pareto-undominated, Nash equilibrium sales function is de…ned by (28) and
(ii) Necessity:
The best, Pareto-undominated, Nash equilibrium sales function is de…ned by (28) and (29) The necessity part of Proposition 2 is completely original. The intuition is the following: if there exists some sub-interval in the range of values of where the sales level is given by Q D ( ) (the regular part of the equilibrium sales function) and over which (26) does not hold, it is clear from the proof of Lemma 6 that one could always construct a (discontinuous) deviation over this sub-interval which would satisfy Proposition 1 and Pareto-dominate the equilibrium considered in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 implies that a bunching occurs optimally in bad circumstances. The best equilibrium from the suppliers'point of view is (i) either the maximal equilibrium in which the market is not served when the consumers'willingness to pay for the good is small (bunching at the zero output level) or (ii) an output ‡oor equilibrium in which the sales level is a positive constant for bad realizations of the demand parameter (bunching at a ‡oor output level). The former (resp. latter) case obtains when is small (resp. great) enough so that h( ) < 0 (resp. h( ) > 0). Put otherwise, the maximal equilibrium is Pareto-optimal i¤ the range of realized values of the demand parameter is large enough.
Example 2 In the uniform distribution case:
The sales level at which bunching occurs is a result of a trade-o¤ between two opposite forces. 33 On one hand, a regular sales function allows a ‡exible adjustment of the level of sales to the circumstances. On the other one, it implies an ine¢ ciently low level of sales, especially in bad circumstances. The ‡exibility argument has little bearing when the ex-ante uncertainty on is small and bunching (at a positive level) always occurs (the interval over which it occurs being an increasing function of the number of suppliers). Moreover, when the number of suppliers tends to in…nity, the ‡oor equilibrium implies a constant equilibrium output in all circumstances.
When ex-ante uncertainty is large; bunching at a positive level never occurs though it would be all the more pro…table as the number of suppliers increases. The key of this apparent paradox is again free disposal: suppliers would collectively bene…t from a ‡oor sales level but under free disposal there is no way to dissuade each of them to individually deviate towards a smaller level of input sales. 35 
Conclusion
This paper investigates how asymmetric information on …nal demand a¤ects strategic interaction between the assembler and a set of upstream monopoly …rms, who independently provide complementary inputs to the better informed 3 3 Notice that the condition de…ning the ‡oor equilibrium output level in the public common agency game 3 4 
Of course a positivity constraint has to be checked in addition, i.e. Q D ( b ) 0: Consider the case where it holds true. It is easy to check (see for instance the Proof of Proposition 2) that b > (
: Clearly the ‡oor equilibrium de…ned by (31) does not satisfy the condition (i) in Proposition 1. The intuitive reason is that the implementation of such a ‡oor output level would require payments decreasing with the sales level over some interval. 3 5 Other suppliers would have to punish smaller sales levels but no such punisments are available when it is possible to pay for a given input quantity and to use a smaller one.
assembler. To this end, we propose an intrinsic private common agency game. In the …rst stage, each of the suppliers maximizes its own expected pro…t by independently proposing a payment contract (price schedule) to the assembler. In the second stage, the assembler learns the realized value of the uncertain demand parameter, choosing whether to accept or reject all the subcontractors' proposals.
We are able to derive a condition which a sales function satis…es if and only if it is an equilibrium one. We …nd that this necessary and su¢ cient equilibrium condition depends on the virtual aggregate pro…t of the vertical structure (which is always smaller than the true aggregate pro…t for any number of suppliers larger than one) and it also implies a ceiling on the sales level in each circumstance. This allows us to make the point that, in a set-up with asymmetric information, coordination failures always lead to some e¢ ciency losses, even when upstream …rms rely on non-linear pricing schemes.
We also …nd that a lot of equilibria satisfy the necessary and su¢ cient equilibrium condition, including regular (di¤erentiable), semi-regular, constant, step-function and hybrid equilibria. However these equilibria are not all equivalent from the point of view of suppliers. In this respect, we …nd that there is a unique Pareto-undominated Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, for the best demand states, sales are increasing with the unknown demand parameter. However, for the worst demand circumstances, two situations are possible, depending on the extent of ex-ante demand asymmetry. When the latter is important, we …nd that the market is not covered in the worst demand states. In other words, a severe form of ine¢ ciency arises in these circumstances. Di¤erently, when the domain of admissible values of the demand parameter is small enough, suppliers can mitigate (without eliminating) the underprovision problem. More precisely, they can implicitly coordinate on an equilibrium with a rigid (and strictly positive) output in bad circumstances (above the regular one). In other words, ine¢ ciency does not preclude full market coverage in this case. However, it remains a problem in the sense that the level of the …nal sales remains excessively low.
Our results on pricing schedules can be compared with Martimort and Stole (2009a) , who also deal with pricing schedules in private common agency games, not necessarily restricted to perfectly complementary inputs. In particular, when the domain of admissible values of the demand parameter is not too wide, we …nd that suppliers have incentives to implicitly coordinate on a semi-regular equilibrium with bunching at the bottom. This possibility was not analyzed by Martimort and Stole (2009a) since they exclusively studied di¤erentiable equilibria. We show that, by coordinating on this equilibrium, suppliers mitigate (without completing eliminating, though) some ine¢ ciency losses resulting from the interplay of asymmetric information and suppliers'non-cooperative behavior. While this is not new for public common agency games (see Martimort, Semenov and Stole (2016) ), this is a new result in a private common agency game.
At a more substantial level, our paper con…rms and extends Spulber's (2016) results on complementary monopolies to a context with private information. In our model bunching at the bottom arises when ex-ante uncertainty is small enough and allows to partially restore e¢ ciency. In the limit, when uncertainty vanishes, we obtain exactly Spulber's result: the equilibrium output level tends toward the constant output level that maximizes aggregate suppliers'pro…ts.
Finally notice that the perfect complementarity case which we study here is quite speci…c in that it allows to characterize all the possible equilibria of the game. When the inputs are imperfect complements, it is impossible to fully eliminate the pricing schedules when trying to characterize the equilibria of the game 36 since we need to account for the degree of inputs complementarity, as well as for the relationship between the …nal downstream sales and each input levels (for each supplier and its rivals as well).
37
APPENDIX Proof of Lemma 1 (a) suppose that 0 > ; from revealed preference it must be that
A is convex as a supremum of convex (linear here) functions. It is also continuous at the endpoints of the domain ; . It is hence absolutely continuous 38 in : Suppose that 0 > ; from the above "revealed preference" inequalities we obtain
, so that, dividing throughout by 0 and letting 0 tend toward , we obtain
Proof of Lemma 2 Suppose on the contrary that Q (q i ( ); ) < q i ( ); where q i ( ) is de…ned by (10), i.e. maximizes supplier i's adjusted pro…t.
Let fQ A ( ); q A i ( )g be solution of the assembler's problem (3a) in which the constraint Q q i has been deleted. Since, at the solution of (3a), this constraint does not bind, Q (q i ( ); ) = Q A ( ) and q i (q i ( ); ) = q A i ( ) do not depend on q i and the corresponding supplier's adjusted pro…t equals
Let us on the other hand consider the solution to the problem of maximizing supplier i's adjusted pro…t when i is able to select directly Q( ) and q i ( ) :
s:t: Q q j ; 8j 6 = i:
From revealed preferences,
Let us show that the supplier i may reach a greater pro…t than (32) simply by choosing to sell a quantity of input i equal to Q S ( ) instead of the quantity
This is obviously the case when the solution Q (Q S ( ); ) of the assembler's problem (3a) under the constraint Q Q S ( ) is such that Q (Q S ( ); ) = Q S ( ) 39 : Let us show that it must indeed be the case that Q (Q S ( ); ) = Q S ( ). Suppose on the contrary that the solution of the assembler's problem (3a) under the constraint Q Q S ( ) implies a sales level Q 0 ( ) < Q S ( ): It must then be that
But, since h( ) 0 and Q 0 ( ) < Q S ( ); were this true, it should be that
contradicting (33). To conclude, supplier i is always able to induce the assembler to select the output and input levels fQ S ( ); q S i ( )g by choosing to supply a quantity Q S ( ) of input i: Then, either Q S ( ) < Q A ( ), in which case supplier i clearly obtains greater (adjusted) pro…ts than at fQ A ( ); q A i ( )g; or Q S ( ) = Q A ( ); in which case an in…nitesimal cost of producing input i is enough to ensure that supplier i is better o¤ when supplying a quantity of input i equal to Q S ( ):
Suppose now instead that the supplier i chooses a supply level
, the supplier i's adjusted pro…t is greater than the pro…t obtained at
) and (ii) in order to produce a quantity of output
< Q( ), the assembler does not need greater quantities of inputs other than i and pays accordingly at most the same aggregate transfer P n j=1;j6 =i T j (q j ( )) to suppliers j 6 = i:
; then by the same argument as in Lemma 2, the supplier i's adjusted pro…t must be greater at Q (
and thus strictly greater than at any Q( ) > h( ) 2
:
Proof of Lemma 3 Let = h( ): De…ne now
and
Since b i is linear in ; b S i ( ) is convex in as a supremum of convex (linear) functions, hence absolutely continuous 40 (AC). By assumption 1, ( ) is invertible so that
is AC and a.e. di¤erentiable. Proof of Proposition 1 (a) Necessity From Lemma 2, Q( ) = q i ( ); 8i = 1; 2; ::; n: Moreover from Remark 1, it must be that Q( )
: On the other hand, we already know that a nondecreasing output function Q( ) (and the input functions q i ( ) = Q( )) solve respectively the Assembler's Problem (4a) and the Suppliers'Problems (9) only if the payment schedules, T i , are de…ned by equations (12) and (14) .
Substituting in (15) P T i (Q ( )) for its value from (8) and rearranging we obtain:
Evaluating the previous condition at = ; we obtain: 
is necessary in the associate problem as well as in the original one. From condition (12) for any 0 > ; we have:
from what we deduce that Q( ) h( ) 2 2 implies that any transfer function T which implements a non-decreasing sales function Q( )
in the associate problem must be non decreasing in Q:
Consider now in the original problem the tari¤ functions T i (q i ) = 1 n T (q i ), i = 1; 2; ::; n: Let us now show that they implement the non-decreasing sales and input functions q i ( ) = Q( ) h( ) 2 2 ; i = 1; 2; ::; n: Suppose on the contrary that there exist
; i = 1; 2; ::; n; which give a strictly greater pro…t to the assembler, i.e.
where e q 2 [0; q( 0 )] 42 : Since T is non decreasing, it follows that
contradicting the fact that T implements Q( ) in the associate problem. 4 1 The single-crossing property implied by a strictly positive cross partial derivative is called increasing di¤erences or supermodularity: see Topkis (1998) and Amir (2005) . 4 2 Remember that free disposal allows the assembler not to consume all the quantities of inputs he buys.
Using now condition (12) , where
is replaced by T (Q( )); together with condition (18), we obtain
Notice that the de…nition of the virtual pro…ts implies that
Given that the tari¤ functions are identical for all, the s i ( ) are identical as well 8i = 1; 2; ::; n: It follows that (34) implies 
which is the necessary (…rst-order) condition (14) for each Principal i: It remains to verify the global second order conditions for each Principal i's problem. We can apply the same proof strategy as in the Agent's case. Consider the associate problem for Principal i : max
Since the single-crossing property (CS + ) is here obviously satis…ed (i.e.
, not only the local second order conditions (34) are satis…ed for the associate problem but also the global ones.
Consider now in the original problem the tari¤ functions T j (q j ) = ; which gives a strictly greater pro…t to supplier i and remembering that the function T is increasing, we must have
where b q 2 [0; q i ( 0 )] 43 : But this contradicts the optimality of Q( ) for supplier i in the corresponding associate problem.
Proof of Corollary 2
The proof is straightforward. Indeed di¤erentiating (18) with respect to ; one obtains V s (:
yielding the results in the preceding Corollary.
Proof of Lemma 4
Given (16), V (Q( ); ) is obviously continuous at any where Q( ) is continuous. So we only have to consider the values of at which Q ( ) is discontinuous. Let e be such a point. Since from Lemma 1, the equilibrium sales function is a.e. di¤erentiable, points of discontinuity are isolated and it is right and left continuous with lim 
for all 2 n n + 1 ; 1 and A ( ) = 0 otherwise, so that the ex-ante expected pro…t of the assembler, E A ; is equal to
The pro…t of subcontractor i; for all 2 
yielding the results in Remark 2.
Proof of Corollary 3
Let us write the condition (18) respectively at some 2 (x i ; x i+1 ] and at x i :
In the equation above, we consider that ; is divided in n + 1 intervals [x j ; x j+1 ) such that Q( ) = Q j , 8 2 (x j ; x j+1 ]; with Q j+1 > Q j ; x 0 = and x n+1 = :
Subtracting (40) The LHS equals V (Q i ; ) V (Q i ; x i ) so that we conclude that V (Q i 1 ; x i ) = V (Q i ; x i ):
Proof of Remark 3 (i) Let us …rst derive (22) . Notice …rst that substituting in (14) P T i (Q ( )) for its value from (8), accounting for A ( ) = 0; and rearranging we obtain an expression which, evaluated at = , yields 
Moreover, introducing in (41) E A = E[( Q( ))Q( )] E[ S ] and using the de…nition of V (Q( ); ); we obtain:
(ii) Let us now derive (23) . Integrating both sides between and ; and then integrating the RHS by parts, we obtain (23).
Proof of Lemma 5
Let us denote by Q 1 ( ) the …rst equilibrium output function and by Q 2 ( ) the second equilibrium output function described in Lemma 5.
Given (42), the di¤erence E S (Q 2 ( ); ) E S (Q 1 ( ); ) between the expected aggregate suppliers'pro…ts under equilibrium output functions Q 2 ( ) and Q 1 ( ) equals 
Proof of Lemma 6
Let us consider the di¤erence between the expected aggregate suppliers' pro…t under the equilibrium output functions Q C ( ) and Q H ( ), which, given (23) , is
where g( ) = (n 1) n(1 h 0 ( ))F ( ) and G( ) = R g(s)ds:
Now, integrating by parts,
Proof of Proposition 2 Given (22) and (28), the suppliers'aggregate expected pro…ts may be written along a semi-regular equilibrium as
Their derivative with respect to SR is easily obtained as:
Remember the constraint Q( ) ; the above derivative is strictly positive. Letting now , strongly Pareto-dominates the original one 46 .
